Child Jackpot winners

Somewhat off the original topic, but I was curious about Jack Harper’s statement that the trust will be relevant property for IHT, and I assume this statement was based on the fact that s31 TA 1925 will apply, giving the trustees power to accumulate income. I was curious because I didn’t believe that to be the case in relation to a bare trust, and it seems that HMRC agree with me (see IHTM16068).

Their view is that an absolute trust for a minor is not a “settlement” for IHT purposes, notwithstanding the application of s31.

My apologies to Jack if I have misunderstood his point.

1 Like

Hi Diana

That’s an interesting perspective and I would be interested to in a definitive response to clarify.

Kind regards, Robin

I am sure some contributors on here will be bored with my regular criticisms of those who defer with apparent unquestioning to the official view.

S43 IHTA 1984:

“(2)
“Settlement” means any disposition or dispositions of property, whether effected by instrument, by parol or by operation of law, or partly in one way and partly in another, whereby the property is for the time being—
(b)held by trustees on trust to accumulate the whole or part of any income of the property or with power to make payments out of that income at the discretion of the trustees or some other person, with or without power to accumulate surplus income”

I don’t care what any HMRC ignoramus or fake news purveyor says. Where s31 applies you have a settlement within s43 (2) (b). If you rely on the official view make absolutely sure you have it in writing based on the exact facts of your case to get yourself a defence to negligence and your client a JR cause of action.

Jack Harper

2 Likes

I should also refer to earlier threads about whether HMRC really understands the nature of a foreign law usufruct and so whether it is a settlement.

1 Like

[Noises off] Prompted, I tend to agree with Jack Harper but - putting the other side of the argument - perhaps checking whether there is the “state of affairs” to which reference was made by Henderson LJ in the CA decision in Barclays Wealth might also assist, if only to eliminate it.

This is unlikely, but if there is no legal “state of affairs” equivalent to a settlement or a trust then that might get you through that s.43(2)(b) ITA hurdle at a pinch, but, again, s.31 Trustee Act 1925 would probably still override that. The issue is the inability of a child to hold or deal with property in their own name, which, unless eluded, automatically creates a trust as envisaged in s.31.

There doesn’t seem to be an app for that - yet - although I have little doubt that several underage prodigies will already have digital assets under their control anyway.

If this helps, technically a French usufruit does not and indeed cannot accumulate income. If any income does get “retained”, for example in the case of a démémbrement of shares in a corporate, it becomes the property of the nu-propriétaire and is not held for the usufruitier. It falls to be retained as capital or distributed to the nu-propriétaire as a capital reserve, but certainly not as income. [Exit stage left]

Peter Harris

1 Like

The major implication of HMRC’s opinion in IHTN16068 is that a £1m gift into a bare trust for a minor with s31 applying is a PET not a CLT. On this interpretation rides exposure, or not, to a 20% tax current charge with possible additional uplift.

In Sippchoice [2020] UKUT 149 the Tribunal said:
" 44. Nonetheless, the fact that HMRC’s pensions tax manual contains passages that support Sippchoice’s case carries little weight in this case. Sippchoice has not sought to make any argument that it relied on the passages or had a legitimate expectation that HMRC would not resile from them. Statements in HMRC’s manuals are merely HMRC’s interpretation of the law in their internal guidance and they do not have the force of law. We must interpret the legislation in accordance with the principles of construction described above and if we conclude, as we have, that the legislation bears a different meaning to that found in the HMRC manual, the legislation must be preferred"

Crown Counsel was instructed to argue that the Manual was wrong in law so HMRC would win. It is possible JR would have succeeded.

in Lobler [2013] UKFTT 141 legislation was held, per the headnote, to have had an “outrageously unfair effect on taxpayer”. HMRC in Uriah Heap mode bleated that it hurt them more than him and the crocodile tears fell (not too many). He was rescued later by the UT at [2015] UKUT152 finding, equally outrageously, that he could be saved by rectification.

HMRC are entitled to their opinion on the law, even if it is not shared by others. It is helpful for them to express it in a Manual. I do not accept that they are morally entitled to instruct Crown Counsel as above. In reality this scurrilous approach takes place regularly not before the Tribunal but in correspondence where taxpayers and advisers are bullied into accepting the party line by inequality of arms.

In the short term, if HMRC forms the internal view that their interpretation is unsound, they should like any commercial litigant concede. Such a litigant would then face costs even before action was joined. It should not subject a taxpayer to a JR claim let alone force a part 54 action and definitely not argue at a without notice hearing that the time limit had been exceeded.

HMRC would do well not just to read their own Litigation and Settlement Strategy but to truly believe in it:
"HMRC does not have a monopoly on understanding how tax law applies to a particular set of facts.

Where HMRC believes that it is unlikely to succeed in litigation it will, in the majority of cases, concede the issue. Taking a case to litigation where HMRC believes it is unlikely to succeed would need to be justified by the particular circumstances, such as a very large amount of tax at stake (in the case itself or from immediate precedent value where a large number of customers is affected), or a fundamental point of principle or behaviour at issue." Surely not the case in Sippchoice.

Ultimately the Lobler result was corrected by legislation. It would be better to have got the law right first time. Opportunites to correct unwanted anomalies in the law are regularly spurned by HMRC. They routinely turn a deaf ear to advance warnings. It is not appropriate for a Government Agency including the NHS and Post Office to defend its institutional reputation in order to save face beyond what is fair and rational.

Advisers and clients cannot easily disarm Goliath but they can exercise caution about what credence they give to statements from an adversary with such a dubious track record.

Jack Harper

In reply to Maitre Harris’ usual a propos sage words, we would regularly exclude s31 where we want the beneficiary to be entitled to the income e.g. to have an IPDI. Does Goliath think this is an unnecessary step?

Jack Harper

In response to Diana Smart’s post (quoting from HMRC’s TSEM manual) Jack Harper responds:

Despite Jack’s concern I think most practitioners can take some (indeed a lot of) comfort that it is clearly not beyond doubt (as Jack states) that where s 31 applies you have a settlement within s43(2)(b).

This specific issue was raised back in 2008 by CIOT/STEP in correspondence with HMRC (Question 33) where the CIOT/STEP set out their reasons why s31 TA 1925 would not result in assets held on a bare trust for a minor being settled property within s43; HMRC confirmed the view so expressed.

I appreciate Jack’s reference to Sippchoice (which tax advisers should note) but in the real world clients have to be advised and decisions made. Any adviser taking the view that a bare trust is not a settlement for IHT (hence PET not CLT & no exit/10 year charges) could, I suspect, not be found to have been negligent in so advising whether or not any subsequent court decision agrees with Jack’s analysis.

Malcolm Finney

In reply to Malcolm, the adviser must make clear to the client the origin of the view, i.e. HMRC’s and its exact form and location, and what reliance can reasonably be placed on it, including the risks of ignoring and contesting it later. Professional negligence which is actionable is plainly to be avoided but a client relationship may be impaired or severed by a lack of explanation/warning which nonetheless complies with the appropriate standard of care. Just telling the client it’s what HMRC say is not certain to comply with that.

At ADML1300 - Incorrect Advice to Customers: When incorrect advice can be binding - HMRC provide cogent hints on how to position a client who proposes to rely on an HMRC statement of the law. A surprising admission by HMRC of at least the theoretical possibility of fallibility! Any client who proposes to adopt a significant contrary position should understand the requirements, substantive and procedural, and practical limitations of JR. Not least that it may have to be finessed alongside an appeal on the pure tax issue, that the FTT has no jurisdiction, and the UT’s is, to me, a bit haphazard.

The Sippchoice report does not say why JR was not pleaded in the UT or litigated separately but I bet it was not because eminent Counsel had not thought of it. If JR is relevant it may be negligent for a tax adviser who is only a non-contentious professional to overlook it. The short time limit and when it starts to run present real difficulty and the court’s discretion to extend it is somewhat of a lottery. Evidence of reliance is another critical hurdle; an adviser should carefully set up the future availability of it and the client must genuinely rely on it.

Jack Harper

Intetesting points here.

The legislation is clear: The National Savings (No. 2) Regulations 2015. Section 4.

Under 16.

“any bond purchased in this way shall be deemed to be held by the person on whose behalf it was purchased”.

On winning, the legislation only allows payments to parents etc - the bond ownership is unambiguous.

Legally the monies are the childs, that has certainly been my understanding. I fail to see how any implied trust is created when the ownership is set out in legislation.

From a financial advice view point, thier are a range of difficulties in terms of any futher investment. The monies may need to be then held on trust. I accept Jacks points on implied to futher trusts settlements. As for “sharing the winnings” etc I agree again with Jacks points - and to the childs litigation against his parents.

Richard Bishop
PFEP

Hi Richard,

I believe the wording you refer to actually creates the implied trust because it identifies the ‘responsible person’ as the legal owner and the child as the beneficial owner.

It seems to also provide evidence of the three certainties?

Thanks for your input

Kind regards, Robin

If thats your interpretation, then I’d continue with your implied trust route.

Its worth noting when drafting legislation if a trust is implied or the provisions create a trust, then futher provisions are tyically drafted to explicity deal with such events.

Richard Bishop
PFEP

Thanks Richard

That’s helpful.

Kind regards

Robin

Richard is spot on. The SI does not create a statutory trust (compare intestacy). It statutorily deems a person, e.g. a minor under 16, who is not the holder to be the holder: Reg 4(4). This seems juridically to create a statutory nomineeship not sounding in trust or contract.

Furthermore Reg 4(2): " A bond may not be purchased or held by more than one person or by a body of persons, whether incorporated or not." An English law trust (even one with a sole trustee) is a body of persons unless defined otherwise and it isn’t.

It seems that the relationship is outside s31 TA 1925. This can extend to both vested and contingent interests but the property must be held “on trust”.

So one is left with a potential problem as regards a significant jackpot. Richard is spot on here too. Under Reg 8 the payment cannot be made to the the minor and addresses only to whom it can be paid, ignoring questions of ownership. I suggest that the logical interpretation is that as the bond is deemed (by delegated legislation) to be held for the minor the winnings must be too. The law that would apply to govern how the person receiving the payment could properly deal with the money might be family law (Children Act) for a parent amenable to its reach or by equity imposing a constructive trust. The actual purchaser or holder of the bond cannot be a trustee but this would not seem to prevent a court from imposing the obligations of what is usually labelled a constructive “trust”. Which may not be a trust for s31.The SI does not concern itself with regulating the legal relationship between the purchaser and the deemed holder.

It is difficult to see how tax law can apply otherwise than on the basis that the minor is taxable in their own right. The 14 year old actress Hayley Mills was found to be a settlor, indeed the only settlor, for income tax of a trust/company structure set up by her actor father Sir (as he then wasn’t) John and taxable on the underlying income. [1974] UKHL TC 49 367. She was the (indirect) settlor by provision of funds by (now) s620 (3) ITTOIA 2005.

The minor not on active service under 18 cannot make a will. Per Underhill the capacity of a minor to settle a trust is “treated in the same way as capacity to contract”, voidable but binding unless repudiated on or shortly after majority. Capacity to make outright gifts seems more obscure in law but may be similar. A parent or grandparent cannot make a settlement of property they do not own; Sir John Mills set up a complex structure of which he was himself the legal settlor for all purposes other than income tax.

The ultimate nightmare remains: at 18 if not earlier your child cannot apparently be prevented from acquiring control over £1m of bond winnings not only to buy a house or avoid student debt but for monumental substance abuse/online gambling. But cheer up Jeremiah! It may never happen. Except of course, for poor old Nineveh, it did.

Jack Harper

2 Likes

What are the precise mechanics?

Option 1
Parent (P) orally declares that he holds in bank account A an amount of £100 for his son (S) absolutely.

P then subscribes for £100 worth of bonds which P is then holding on the declared trust.

Option 2
P simply subscribes for £100 bonds in P’s own name in respect of which he then declares he holds the bonds on trust for S absolutely.

Under each of the above two options a bare (not an implied (ie resulting or constructive)) trust comes into being.

Option 3
P simply subscribes for £100 bonds in his own name. No declaration of trust is made, although he tells his wife (W) that he holds the bonds for S.

W tells S that as he is now 18 he can now claim the legal title to the bonds from P . S asks P for the bonds. P says W is wrong and that the bonds belong to P.

In this case S would seek to argue that P held the bonds on constructive trust.

I’m not sure that the terms and condition set out by NSI can of themselves create any form of trust.

Malcolm Finney

Whatever the Regs do they do not create a trust or regulate the legal or equitable (“beneficial”) ownership of bonds or winnings. They establish a (delegated) statutory relationship regime in place of a contractual one. I have little doubt that a court would enforce its terms if need be, as it would a contract.

Option 1. I suggest that a court might deprive P of bond and winnings if a fancy trust were declared but a bare trust (s31 applying or excluded) seems to achieve only what the Regs would if P held as statutory nominee.

Option 2. Same as in 1. There is no mischief or evasion of the statutory mechanism.

The Regs do not prevent fancy trusts. They absolve NS&I from having to recognise them; compare s126 CA 2006.

Option 3. If any constructive trust or other right of action emerges from this imbroglio, pursuant to legal principle, it is of no concern to NS&I. It can’t be joined and its responsibilities are owed only to those purchasers who properly fall within Reg 4. Here that is P. Reg 4(3) says a bond may not be purchased for another except within the limits of 4(4), essentially minors under 16 and persons lacking capacity.

The jeopardy for those who use subterfuge to outwit NS&I is that an organisation with a big wallet and a steely determination to make an example of “smartiboots” may choose not to pay or to recover payments made, pour encourager les autres.

Jack Harper

1 Like

On reflection under Option 1 and 2 there is theoretically mischief, and jeopardy, if S is a minor over 16 but the Regs are really there to allow NS&I to deal exclusively with P, whatever shenanigans he and S aged 16 or more are up to.

If P buys for a named minor under 16 NS&I will recognise that but can hardly do so if there is no disclosure, in which case they can properly deal with P alone. I doubt they would be interested in enforcement if P’s omission was an oversight; and possibly not even if it was deliberate where this would deprive S of the fruits of any action of his against a fraudulent P. The Regs seem to prevent NS&I from being joined in any such action, or being compelled to recover money from P, and probably exonerate them from having to pay P, at least without notice of the contested issue. If they have notice they may suspend payment until they have the judgment but strictly it is hard to see that a successful S would have any direct right against them. He might conceivably by subrogation but does a fraudulent P have a right against NS&I that can be subrogated? Isn’t litigation grand?

I’m not sure anyone wants to read this. It is somewhat tangential to the trust conundrum.

Jack Harper

1 Like

I think you may have misunderstood the intention of my post. No skullduggery was intended.

All I was seeking to do was to identify the options which would determine who beneficially held the bonds (and hence who would own the £1m win) on/post purchase. Thus, for example, the bonds are held on bare trust (Options 1 and 2 ) or constructive trust (Option 3) irrespective of the NSI Regs. (I was trying to separate out the bare trust from the constructive trust). Under each option the child would be entitled to the £1m. The NSI Regs do not determine the above.

All the Regs do is to state, inter alia, who are the “Persons entitled to purchase and hold bonds” [Reg 4] and who may apply for payment [Reg 6].

Reg 4(4) provides: " (4) A bond may be purchased—
(a) on behalf of and in the name of a minor under the age of sixteen years by a parent …
and any bond purchased in this way shall be deemed to be held by the person on whose behalf it was purchased’.

Reg 6(1) then provides “6.—(1) An application for payment of the amount repayable, or any other amount payable, in relation to a bond must be made by the holder of the bond in the approved form”.

I’m losing track hence my last post.

Malcolm Finney

1 Like

I think the scheme of the Regs is designed to permit NS&I to deal only with a registered purchaser of bonds, plus certain specified others, and to ignore who owns them as a matter of property law and any equities. I suspect that the right of such a purchaser is a non-assignable chose, or assignable if at all in equity, and that the bonds themselves can be settled or gifted but without the transferee being entitled to be registered and subject to an equitable obligation on the transferor to account for any future “payments” due from NS&I.

An analogy might be with a company register. s126 CA 2006 ensures that the company itself only has to deal with a member who is registered with the legal title to its shares but these can be usually be settled (or gifted) by their holder without any transfer of that title plus registration of the transferee (as long as the settlement/gift does not trigger a compulsory transfer under pre-emption provisions or, worse, expropriation!). The transferee may have an equitable right to call for the transfer of the legal title but the company is only required to register that if it complies with the Articles.

Not all enforceable equitable obligations are trusts but here this may be for most legal purposes a distinction without a difference. If however a law such as AML requires only express trusts to be registered, it must be determined whether a trust arises and if so whether it is express or is just implied because arising by operation of law. That was where we came in but contributors have then questioned whether a trust arises at all by virtue of the Regulations alone and if so how. In my view the Regulations themselves do not create a trust but, as they also do not prevent one, an express trust of bonds may be lawfully created and would then be registrable for AML. The simple act of buying a bond for another may itself cause a trust to be created but it will be implied and not express unless the act is carried out pursuant to such an express trust.

The Regulations do raise a separate question (as they limit the categories of who can legally purchase bonds) if a purchaser who is apparently eligible is actually not, by a misunderstanding or (as Malcolm puts it) skullduggery, because whether as a trustee or not, he is buying for another where this is not permitted by the Regs. Does this ever invalidate the purchase so that the relevant bonds never become trust property, for AML or any other purpose?

Jack Harper

2 Likes

Having read all of these comments, I have decided to steer clear of premium savings bond for my grandson and go for cryptocurrency instead!

Patrick Moroney

2 Likes