RNRB and Ipdi for Spouse followed by Discretionary Trust

Deceased spouse (Mr) left his estate to surviving spouse on an IPDI with flexible DT on death of life tenant. His estate includes a share in a property that would qualify for RNRB if it passed to a lineal descendant. Family have done nothing to implement this Will trust (we would usually appoint the QRI to the children during the life tenant’s lifetime and to take effect on life tenant’s death if this is not automatically provided for in the Will as per Kessler’s precedent). The surviving spouse (Mrs) has now also died her estate passing to a DT. Of course, I can do a simple S144 to kids to use her RNRB but the value of her share of the property in her free estate is not sufficient for me also to appoint the TRNRB under the same appointment. We are, however, still within 2 years of the first deceased spouse’s death. Can I therefore now do an appointment out of what (is now) a discretionary trust of the first spouse’s estate to a beneficiary who will then enter into a Variation under s142 of the first spouse’s estate to give the QRI to the children so we can then claim RNRB on the first deceased’s estate? If so, would the beneficiaries under the appointment have to be different to the beneficiaries under the variation? (I appreciate s144 will not apply to the appointment in view of the intervening life interest).

Many thanks in anticipation of responses.

Sounds like a good plan to me.

Although as you say s.144 cannot apply to H’s estate there seems no bar to the DT trustees first appointing a QRI to lineal descendants who then effect a s.142 variation. W’s PRs do not need to consent under (2A) as presumably there will be no additional tax because of RNRB (plus NRB if the QRI value exceeds it).

As long as the beneficiaries of the appointed QRI out of each DT are lineal descendants I don’t see that it matters that their identity or size of share differs as between the two appointments.

The appointment out of H’s DT will constitute an exit chargeable event but possibly with a nil or very small IHT liability. Is this overridden if reading back under s.142 is chosen despite the chargeable event not being caused by the variation itself? I explore that below as regards CGT.

There is a CGT deemed disposal on the appointment out of H’s DT. This is not literally covered by reading back under s.62(6) as it is not made by the variation itself. But there will perhaps be the trustee PPRR if W in the property while LT but not for the period after her death unless a beneficiary of the DT has been living there.

There is a counter-argument that, while it is not explicit, the reading back treatment deems the appointee’s acquisition to have been effected by the deceased and that this overrides the earlier actual acquisition and so also the corresponding actual disposal by the trustees.

Where an asset is given by Will to A who sells it and thereafter A varies the Will so that B is deemed to acquire it, the subsection does not indicate that B is to be treated as having made the earlier actual disposal and not A. B is not entitled to the sale proceeds unless the variation so provides. This highlights the fact that the variation has a real world property operation which must have the same effect in property law whether reading back is or is not chosen for tax purposes and that property law effect cannot be retrospective. The earlier sale by A will have continuing real world legal consequences as between A and A’s buyer. These could only be altered with the buyer’s consent.

The OP does not in fact involve such a sale but it is a reminder that the reading back is a fiction for tax purposes only and the drafter of tax legislation often fails to envisage even the most obvious possible outcomes of it.

As I say there is an argument when reading back is chosen that by implication the fiction of retrospection must logically ignore real world events for each or both of the 2 taxes in question which contradict the fictional tax treatment.

As regards the appointment out of W’s Will DT reading back is mandatory under s.144 for IHT alone. There is here no argument for ignoring the CGT effect of the trustees’ deemed disposal.

Jack Harper

I am probably wrong (as I am disagreeing with Jack), but I always thought that this was NOT possible. As the OP says, s144 does not apply to the appointment of the first spouse’s estate to a beneficiary. (The beneficiary is receiving a distribution from settled property.) Therefore, I do not believe the beneficiary can then enter into a variation under s142 as the distribution being varied was not ‘property immediately comprised’ in the first spouse’s estate as per the requirements of s142.

Ihsan Ali
I Will Solicitors Ltd

I don’t entirely follow. S.144 and s.142 can operate in relation to the same estate. The objective of using s.144 is to get over the problem that DT trustees cannot properly use s.142 to vary the estate dispositions because it is outwith their powers as a dealing with the trust fund otherwise than in accordance with the trust deed.

I do not say I would not be prepared to argue, faced with a done deal, that a variation by way of creating absolute interests in the estate in favour of eligible discretionary beneficiaries was in substance if not in form a lawful distribution to them. I would not with a blank page recommend that course of action because there is no clear authority that Equity would reach that conclusion.

Each section imposes a fiction for tax purposes alone. As usual the drafter of the law leaves taxpayers, their advisers, and judges, to determine the unstated limits of any application of the fiction to particular facts. A cowardly and callous dereliction of duty.

In particular, as I have pointed out, the fiction ignores a myriad of possible real world occurrences which flatly contradict the fiction. Just one example: A is given a specific gift of a property by Will and varies it by substituting a gift by that Will to B. In fact A has already sold or given away the asset or it has ceased to exist as where a leasehold was given and it has merged with A’s freehold.

I do not see why A, discretionary trustees, cannot distribute a property to B, an eligible beneficiary, by Fiction 144, and why B cannot then vary the gift in the Will to C by Fiction 142. There might be a distinct pong of fraud on a power if C is not also a beneficiary and A knows in advance of B’s intention. But apart from that DT trustees have no obligation to police what an absolute owner distributee does with the distributed asset.

But those are not the facts of the OP. The DT is the remainder to the IPDI of the widow who in the real world is dead. S.144 was never in point as there was a prior IPDI for however short a time. A distribution from the DT of the asset (the QRI) which in the real world vested in the trustees in possession on the LT’s death is a chargeable RPT event, not one within s.144 at all. The distributees, the children, can then vary the Will so that the QRI is deemed to have been a specific gift to them.

They are not “re-directing” the life interest of a dead LT which HMRC regard, wholly arbitrarily, as not permitted: IHTM35O42. It is not plain to me why this is seen by them as A Fiction Too Far, when they do not care that a variation redirects an asset that has been sold, given away or has even ceased to exist. But that is not what is planned here: the IPDI to the widow in the QRI is not re-directed but expunged altogether and the children substituted ab initio as if the Will had been originally so drafted.

In my opinion in property law the appointee children already own the QRI. The widow is dead and her PRs have no claim over the asset as her interest in it terminated. Arguably the children are the only necessary parties to the variation but the DT trustees can have no scruples or run any risk of challenge by being party also as they are doing no more thereby than giving further assurance to the precise distribution they have already made.

What objection can HMRC make? The widow is dead, her PRs have no standing, the DT trustees were not given a gift by the Will. For property law none of these is a proper party, only the children are. If they are not, the outcome is that no one can make a variation whereas if the widow had still been alive the trustees could have first appointed remainders to the children and then they and their mother could certainly have effected a variation. The simple legal question is who is the person or persons in s.142(1) “who benefit or would benefit under the dispositions”. That person, the widow, is dead. If she had been given an absolute interest her PRs could clearly have made a variation in favour of the children. If HMRC argue that there is now no such person within in s.142(1) so no variation is possible at all it is casuistry of the first order. But then, have you met HMRC?

This is a tax only fiction. There is no reason at all why the variation should not be made because as a matter of property law it is a nonsense: the children already own the asset and the purported variation with reading back is purely their humouring the performative lunacy of the s142 fiscal fiction. There is no downside except an RPT charge on the trust distribution, with CGT holdover unless the asset is going to be sold pronto and subject to the resultant tax cost being better than a disposal by the PRs. And on the assumption that there is no non-tax preference for retaining the asset in the DT if HMRC were refuse s142 treatment.

The clock of course is ticking and there may not be time to explore the official view either by NSC application or informally. HMRC as far as I know have no publicised settled position on the point, although they are devious enough to po-facedly argue it is a “re-direction”.

Jack Harper

H’s Will created an IPDI for W. W has died and H’s estate is now held on a DT.

B is not entitled under H’s Will. B is a potential beneficiary of the DT.

B receives a distribution (QRI) from the DT following an exercise of the trustees power of appointment.

The crux is whether B can then execute a s142 variation to H’s children (himself?) and HMRC will accept this as if H’s QRI passed to B absolutely such that the RNRB is available.

My understanding was this is not possible as B is purportedly varying his entitlement from the DT and not his entitlement from H’s estate. (B does not inherit from H’s estate and the DT is a separate entity.)

I note the points you make regarding the tax fiction of s142 being very wide and agree, but maybe this is ‘too wide’. I would be interested to see any statutory authority or case law which shows whether this is, or is not possible, or whether any other members have had any practical cases with HMRC regarding this.

Ihsan

I find myself in agreement with Ihsan on this one.

A pity s.142 cannot be used by W’s executors to vary her life interest.

Simon Northcott

Thank you so much all for your input. I will post any update / outcome with HMRC.

We agree that uncertainty bedevils advising this positively as a course of action.

But do you agree with my point that if the LT had still been alive the trustees could have first appointed fixed remainders and the LT could have disclaimed or varied her IPDI? If this is done after her death is it the position that no one can make a variation?

Also what is varied under s.142 are the dispositions made by a deceased testator’s Will. The entitlement of a beneficiary is not as such what is varied and what actual entitlement to the assets of the estate which he may or may not have at the date of the variation is of no relevance to the operation of the section.

For example A has an absolute interest. He assigns it to B. Can he then make a variation of his interest to B with reading back? What stops him?

Jack Harper

The barrier to it working it seems to me is that the persons benefitting under H’s Will, for the purposes of s.142, were W and the trustees, not the children, who were merely discretionary beneficiaries. They cannot purport to vary a disposition which was not in their favour.

If you proceed regardless, careful thought needs to be given to the tax effect of what is a deed of gift, if s.142 does not apply.

Simon Northcott

That is why I said that one would need to ensure that the real world property law outcome of the variation was understood and acceptable in tax and non-tax terms whatever the s.142 final result.

The document effecting the variation cannot practicably be made conditional on HMRC’s agreeing to s.142 applying—unless it becomes irrevocable in any event just before the end of the 2 year period. This is a device sometimes found in a discretionary will where default provisions become operative in case the trustees do not trigger s.144 exhaustively within the time limit.

The section does not require the IOV to be unconditional but if HMRC refuse to accept it the only very expensive remedy would be a JR mandatory order, a fantasy save in a case with a huge amount of tax at stake.

Jack Harper

Another way of looking at it is that if it works there would have been no need for s.144.

Simon Northcott