I believe that the right of survivorship operates so that a deceased’s former equitable interest does not become part of his real and personal estate: AEA 1925 ss 1(1) and (3), 3(1) and (4). He was not “entitled to it at the date of his death”. He cannot leave it by his Will. It is thus not available to pay his debts: ss32,34, Sch 1 Part II. So the deceased joint owner, here the wife, strictly, has nothing for anyone to “inherit” and the survivor, here the husband, does not strictly “inherit” the share which passes to him by operation of law and not by will or intestacy. So in my view it became property “solely owned” by him.
This assumes that the term is not defined or, on a proper construction, is to be given any different contextual meaning. Cases show that, upon probative evidence adduced, the deceased used a term, here the term “inherited”, as a label to include the other half of the formerly jointly owned property. There may be evidence here of why formal lifetime severance was only effected as to Property1, especially given their physical configuration, as long as this was intentional and not through confusion about the the title numbers. Was any advice given at the time or is there any other evidence for not severing Property 2?
(The deceased may be jointly and severally liable for a debt charged on the joint property. The liability will be for the entire debt, and devolves on his PRs, and if the security is insufficient his estate will have to pay the excess, unless he has an expressly agreed contractual right of contribution).
IHT is different because of of s4(1) IHTA as the charge is based on a fictional transfer of the value his estate immediately before his death:s4(1). So her joint interest was chargeable because she owned it beneficially at that moment but of course exempt as spouse transfer. Furthermore, the subsequent decrease in a person’s estate’s value caused by the survivorship transfer is to be ignored:s171(2). In s142(1) the words “or otherwise” permit post-death notional severance and variation of a deceased’s share (as if a tenant in common).
At general law a will cannot effect a severance but there are decided cases which indicate that mutual wills, properly so called and not merely mirror wills, can effect severance if the operation of the doctrine is inconsistent with the right of survivorship. This is based on there being a lifetime agreement of the kind that underpins the doctrine. Other cases indicate that it may be successfully argued on appropriate facts that severance occurred by mutual conduct of joint owners during their lifetime inconsistent with a joint tenancy subsisting at the first death.
I mention these for completeness as it is precisely in contentious probate that such cases, which are highly fact- and evidence-dependent, will be cited (often out of desperation). Evidence that there was no Form A restriction on the register for Property 1 is significant though not conclusive. Similarly, in the other direction, if the wife’s will specifically bequeathed her interest to a third party but even perhaps as here to her husband. She may just not have not been advised, properly ot at all, or misunderstood advice, that she had nothing to bequeath but it might evidence a lifetime agreement to sever, at least if corroborated by other evidence particularly on the part of the husband.
Jack Harper